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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Apparat take on Iranian arms 
What a difference a year makes.  Until this year, proposed Russian missile sales 
to Iran were raised in hush tones, even in Moscow, and American concerns 
about nuclear cooperation with Iran were "front burner" issues–the subject of 
secret agreements made at nearly the highest levels.  But in January 2007, 
Russian Tor-M1 missiles bound for Iran are a rushed shipment, announced 
publicly by the Defense Ministry, albeit as "defensive" weapons, but sadly 
ignored in the American White House. 
 
Many things have changed:  Ask former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni 
Primakov.  His recent articles in Russian media outlets have trumpeted the many 
ways in which American concerns and interests in the Middle East have been 
circumvented, in order to create a "multi-polar world order" in which Russia once 
again assumes a role as power broker.  (1)  According to Primakov, the US, 
specifically the Bush Administration, occupied by an increasingly virulent 
sectarian clash in Iraq, refuses to heed the advice of wiser, cooler heads with 
regard to Middle East issues, and therefore is traveling further down the path of 
conflict escalation.  Primakov posits Russia as a tour guide along that path, but in 
just what direction it would lead is unclear. 
 
Primakov manages to gloat across a range of policy issues, including domestic 
policy, in which the stands of "dogmatic liberals" are defeated: "we 
finally…rejected the idea that we can get by without decisive state intervention in 
the economy." (2)  He likewise takes swipes at the policies of specific individuals 
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within the Putin administration, such as:  "the Finance Minister's [Kudrin's] 
opposition to establishing the Investment Fund; in other words, opposition to 
goal-directed state funding for the projects Russia needs." He also assails the 
danger of exacerbating "xenophobia-driven nationalist" activity by "claiming the 
Russia has its own unique kind of "sovereign democracy"." (3)  (Kremlin Aide 
Vladislav Surkov was the ideological proponent behind the much-debated, and 
subsequently discarded, sovereign democracy debate.) 
 
Primakov's crowing aside, the Bush White House has appeared preoccupied with 
events in Iraq to the detriment of other developments.  White House Press 
Spokesman Tony Snow, when asked about the Russian Tor-M1 missile shipment 
to Iran, and the possibility of more such deals, fumbled, as if hearing the news for 
the first time: "I don't know where that report -- I'll get you some detail on it. I'm 
unaware." (4) 
 
Aside from the qualitative change in the foreign policy environment, which 
Primakov so fondly describes, another issue lingers behind the Tor missile 
shipment and threatens to emerge as the dominant factor in Russian political 
developments this year:  The Putin succession and its corresponding campaigns 
and backroom jockeying for position—all of which require large capital reserves 
for serious contenders.  
 
Putative successors to Putin are blessed with a range of options to fund their 
campaigns, both public and private.  The energy sector, transportation, 
import/export licenses, railways and construction all have potentially profitable 
(and siphonable) elements to recommend their use in creating slush funds.  The 
Russian government's goal to strengthen the economy during the Putin era 
expanded the drive to attract foreign investment, which, in many instances, 
demanded greater transparency in transactions.  Transparency is anathema to 
the caching of assets (monetary and otherwise) that are useful in a Russian 
succession struggle.  While certain industries, most of which are controlled by an 
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arm of the Kremlin apparat or close kin, have managed to protect branches of 
their income stream from close scrutiny, there is one industry for which discretion 
and opacity are, in fact, its life blood–the arms trade. 
 
The missile shipment to Iran provided many possible benefits to its Russian 
promoters, aside from the "Primakov effect" policy perks.  Certainly, it brings in 
revenue to the defense sector, and its primary administrator, Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov.  The "success" of the deal garners positive prestige for this 
alleged succession front-runner. 
 
The unfriendly climate for arms trade with Iran that has existed previously may 
suggest that this missile deal had stronger, or perhaps broader, ties to the 
Kremlin.  The Director of Rosoboroneksport, Sergei Chemezov, already one of 
Russia's wealthiest men, (5) and a colleague of Putin's from Germany in the 
1980s, (6) certainly was key in shepherding the deal through the complex 
environment of sanctions against Iran, and his reputation, at the very least, likely 
increased significantly as a result. 
 
A missile deal of this type with Iran would have been in clear violation of the 
once-secret agreement produced by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in 
1995.  (7) Putin's new regime, stabilized by President Boris Yel'tsin's New Year's 
Eve transition imprimatur, obviously was secure enough to set aside the "secret" 
agreement in 2000, and thus create the environment in which the Tor-M1 missile 
sale would be feasible. (8) 
 
The producers of the missile, a defense contracting firm called Almaz-Antei 
Defense Company, was created in 2004 and approved by a direct presidential 
decree, which publicized a list of approved defense contractors. (9)  Almaz-
Antei's  former General Director was Igor Klimov, who was appointed in February 
2004 and murdered later the same year.  (10) The head of the board and CEO of 
Almaz-Antei, who brought Klimov on board the Concern, is Viktor Ivanov.  (11) 
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Ivanov, in addition to being a top Kremlin Aide, is reportedly Putin's original 
sponsor and patron in the Security Services.  (12)  Absent the publication of a 
thorough financial accounting of the incomes of Russian public officials (Is that 
Boris Nemtsov initiative still on the books?), it is, of course, impossible to trace 
with certainty the profit stream from the Tor missile shipment.  Nor does the fact 
that so many of Putin's close associates stand to benefit from the deal mean that 
the profits flow upstream and that the president might profit financially. 
 
It is interesting, nonetheless, to look beyond the bleak foreign policy implications 
and consider who benefits on the Russian domestic scene.  When the 
succession campaign heats up and analysts gauge the status of contenders by 
the line outside their office door, it might do well to ask how much of that prestige 
was purchased…and follow the money. 
 
Source Notes:  
 
(1) Yevgeni Primakov, "2006: Successful, but Unbalanced; Problems to be 
solved in the year ahead," 16 Jan 07, Rossiiskaya gazeta; What the Papers Say 
(WPS) via Lexis-Nexis; and  Yevgeni Primakov, U.S. Helpless In Regard to Iraq, 
Moscow News (Russia), 19 Jan 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Primakov, Rossiiskaya gazeta, Ibid. 
(3) Ibid.  Primakov's foray into domestic politics and his direct assaults on Kudrin 
and Surkov almost suggest a man with the Presidency in his scopes.  While 
Primakov's age would seem to make a bid for the Kremlin unlikely, there are 
stranger things in Russian politics than are dreamt of here. 
(4) Tony Snow, White House Press Briefing, 16 Jan 07, 12:11 EST via 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070116-6.html accessed 
January 24, 2007. 
(5) Andrei Kolesnikov, "New Oligarchs," Russian Gazeta.ru website on 26 Dec 
06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis. 
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pp. 24 – 28; WPS via Lexis-Nexis; "They are neither Owners nor Managers; They 
are Overseers, Gazeta, 24 Aug 04; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Beslan revisited 
The Federation Council report concerning the 2004 Beslan terrorist attack was 
presented in parliament late last year by commission head Aleksandr Torshin. 
The report, presented quietly just before the break for the Christmas holidays, 
was anticipated because of the manner in which it might affect information 
released by commission member Yuri Savelyev, last August. 
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Savelyev is an expert in explosives, as well as a Duma deputy with the Rodina 
Party. He conducted a detailed study of the Beslan attack and examined several 
specific questions. An earlier report, produced by the North Ossetian parliament, 
had argued that three explosions occurred during the storming of the school, 
rather than one, as had previously been thought. (1)  Agreeing with that analysis, 
Savelyev investigated the source of the explosions and concluded that the first 
explosions that went off during the siege were not detonated by the terrorists (as 
the theory advanced by state prosecutors holds), but rather came from another 
direction. In other words, they were fired by the security forces surrounding the 
building. (2)  Another theory about the explosions, advanced by captured terrorist 
Nur-Pashi Kulayev, was that a sniper from the security forces shot the terrorist 
who had his foot on the pedal to set off the explosives and that once the 
explosives went off,  all those surrounding the building, family members and 
security forces alike, stormed the school. 
 
Savelyev also looked into the presence of tanks and armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) during the siege. Although it had not been mentioned in any of the official 
reports, Savelyev found evidence that a tank had been used in the storming of 
the building. He analyzed tracks left by the tanks treads and also the rubble that 
had been hit by shots which based on the results, could only have been fired 
from a tank. (3) 
 
The number of terrorists involved in the attack also has been a matter of debate. 
The state originally claimed that 32 terrorists carried out the attack, of whom 31 
died and one, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, was captured and sentenced to life in prison, 
last May. (Relatives of Beslan victims recently appealed the case to the Supreme 
Court, hoping that it would hand down a death sentence to the terrorist, even 
though capital punishment is illegal in Russia. The Supreme Court upheld the 
original ruling.) In contrast to the state’s estimate, Savelyev placed the number of 
terrorists involved in the attack at more than sixty. (4)  
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The Duma deputy published his report on the website of activist Marina 
Litvinovich. (5) Litvinovich works to call attention to issues related to both Beslan 
and the 2002 Nord-Ost terrorist attack.  
 
The Beslan attack spawned several organizations, all of which have followed 
closely the investigations into the incident. Among them are the Mothers of 
Beslan and the Voice of Beslan. Both organizations are composed of relatives of 
victims of the attacks. Their efforts largely have been directed toward making 
sure that the special forces who responded to the terrorist attack—the security 
services, the Interior Ministry, and the army—are held responsible for their failure 
to act effectively.  
 
Despite the substantial doubts thrown on the state’s theories about the attack by 
Savelyev’s investigation, the commission report (or Torshin report) essentially 
toes the official line. It places responsibility for the explosions completely on the 
terrorists, rather than on any actions taken by government forces. (6)  The report 
also claimed to have found no evidence of tank rounds having been fired during 
the spontaneous storming of the building. (7)  It reasserts that there were 34 
terrorists involved in Beslan, making only minimal adjustments for testimony from 
survivors that some of the terrorists got away. (8)  
 
The report named Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, Abu Dzeit, and Magomed 
Khashiyev as the masterminds behind the attack. All four have since been 
reported dead, with Russian security forces claiming responsibility for some of 
the deaths. 
 
Torshin presented the report to the Federation Council on 22 December. That 
same day, the Council announced that the Commission’s work was finished. The 
report, however, drew considerable criticism from the Mothers of Beslan, Voice of 
Beslan and Yuri Savelyev. Savelyev has stated that he is in complete 
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disagreement with the report's findings. The Prosecutor General’s Office has 
extended its own investigation of the Beslan incident to April 1. 
 
The Torshin report underscores the impotence of the Russian legislature in 
exercising any sort of civilian control over the security forces. Despite the 
evidence demanding further investigation, the Torshin committee shied away 
from addressing any issues which could offend the FSB, the Interior Ministry or 
the armed forces. 
 
The treatment by the media of each of the reports varied in interesting ways: 
Savelyev was interviewed at great length in August on an official Kremlin 
international news broadcast, even though his report contained damaging 
information on the security forces. The Torshin report, on the other hand, was 
covered rather summarily in ITAR-TASS, which reported that the commission 
had decided that "most issues have been cleared up." (9)  Perhaps the murder of 
journalist Anna Politkovskaya last fall has resulted in an increased reluctance 
among the media to cover controversial topics. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Kesayev Report Points a Finger in Beslan,” Moscow Times, 7 Dec 05 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) “Press Conference with Yuri Savelyev,” Official Kremlin International News 
Broadcast, 30 Aug 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid.  
(5) Marina Litvinovich’s website is www.pravdabeslana.ru.  
(6) “Parliamentary Commission on Beslan Attack Finishes Probe,” TASS, 22 Dec 
06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “Official Beslan Report Absolves Special Forces in Massacre,” Agence 
France Presse, 22 Dec 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(8) “Parliamentary Commission on Beslan Attack Finishes Probe,” TASS, 22 Dec 
06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
FSB "Annual Report" 
On several occasions in mid-December 2006, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev 
met with members of the Russian media. First, on 15 December, he participated 
in a one-on-one question and answer session with Izvestia Daily. Then, four days 
later, he met with a larger pool of journalists drawn from a variety of news outlets, 
including ITAR-TASS. 
 
The question and answer session with Izvestia touched on a wide variety of 
subjects, including the national-regional command and control structure of the 
service; the situation in Chechnya; the improvement of Russia’s border 
fortifications and counter-espionage operations. (1) 
 
According both to the one-on-one interview, as well as the broader press 
session, the FSB supposedly scored some remarkable successes in 2006. 
Specifically, Patrushev claimed that the agency had “neutralized” more than 40 
separate Chechen “rebel bands,” (2) arrested some 27 foreign spies, (3) 
“prevented” 300 separate terror attacks on Russian soil, stopped hackers from 
obtaining access to National Security materials, and “averted” a 45 billion ruble 
loss due to economic crimes. (4) 
 
 Both of the press sessions were notable for the fact that no difficult questions 
were asked about the alleged Basayev “assassination,” or—more pertinently—
the Politkovskaya and Litvinenko murders, both of which have brought suspicion 
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on the FSB. As such, the media opportunities could be described more 
reasonably as public-relations efforts, designed to portray the FSB as a 
productive and successful super-agency. 
 
Georgian provokatsia redux 
Late in November, Georgian police arrested four Russians, all apparently 
members of military intelligence (the GRU). According to Georgian Interior 
Minister Vano Merabishvili, the group had been active in the republic for some 
years, planning a major act of “provocation.” (5) That Russia had long been 
planning—and executing—action against Tbilisi was supported primarily by 
evidence that the Gori bombings of 2005 were perpetrated by the GRU. 
Additionally, within Russia, anti-Georgian rhetoric became increasingly shrill 
throughout 2006.  Russian reaction to the arrests suggested that Moscow was 
seeking a casus belli; according to security expert Pavel Felgenhauer, a decision 
to ‘take down’ the Georgian regime was made during a Security Council meeting 
days after the arrests. (6) 
 
If the decision to force regime-change was indeed taken, then President Mikhail 
Saakashvili’s response, namely to release the men to the OSCE—and thence 
into Moscow’s hands—threw a spanner into Moscow’s plans, removing the casus 
belli, at least temporarily. (7) But now it seems that Moscow has discovered 
another route by which it can keep the instability in the Caucasus brewing. 
 
On 21 November 2006, the secessionist South Ossetia held two parallel 
presidential elections. In one poll held in Georgian-controlled areas, Dmitry 
Sanakoyev, a pro-Georgian politician was elected, while other areas of South-
Ossetia voted for Eduard Kokoiti, a pro-Moscow official. (8) 
 
Just before the election, Georgian counter-intelligence officers in South Ossetia 
arrested a local resident, Kaja Badayev, who was—according to the authorities—
an agent of the FSB. According to the official press release following his arrest, 
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during interrogation Badayev confessed to receiving orders to arrange 
Sanakoyev’s assassination. A tape of his apparent ‘confession’ was aired on 
Georgian television news broadcasts. (9) 
 
Badayev’s arrest, and the allegation that he was acting on the Kremlin’s orders 
provoked a storm of counter-accusations from a variety of sources. The “South 
Ossetian KGB” claimed that the assassination had in fact been planned by 
Georgian Security agencies as a provokatsia designed to allow Tbilisi to pin the 
blame on Tskhinvali, and to take action against the secessionists. This claim was 
reiterated by a spokeswoman of the South Ossetian Information and Press 
Committee, who claimed that “the statement on the arrest of some spy…is but 
another provocation staged by Georgian secret services. They need it prior to 
assassination of the so-called alternative president Sanakoyev.” (10) 
 
A convoluted Tbilisi conspiracy to kill a South Ossetian politician loyal to Georgia, 
in order to provide cause for action against the secessionists, seems far-fetched. 
On the other hand Moscow’s recent history speaks for itself. As such, it seems 
safe to conclude that Badayev’s arrest is evidence of just the latest in a long line 
of Moscow-launched plots designed to destabilize the Caucasus republic and to 
stymie Georgia’s legitimate aspirations to re-absorb secessionist areas. 
Moreover, the fact that Russian agents have been caught red handed yet again, 
does not speak highly of the competence of the relevant security agencies. 
 
Litvinenko Murder Update 
On November 1 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, an FSB defector to Britain, and 
author of “Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within,” met with an Italian contact in 
London. The individual concerned—Mario Scaramella—was an Italian ‘security 
expert,’ who allegedly wished to pass on to Litvinenko highly sensitive 
information regarding the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, as well as details of a 
“Kremlin hit-list,” which supposedly contained both of their names. On the same 
day, Litvinenko conducted another meeting, this time with Andrei Lugovoi, a 
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former KGB and FSB agent, who now works as a security consultant in Moscow. 
A third unnamed individual also was present at this meeting. (11) Two days later, 
on 3 November, Litvinenko was checked into Barnet General Hospital, and from 
there was transferred to University College Hospital, where he died on 23 
November with high levels of Polonium-210 in his system. 
 
A number of theories emerged to ascribe responsibility in Litvinenko's murder. In 
the meantime, the British police was carrying out a murder investigation. On 
December 4, British detectives flew to Moscow to interview Andrei Lugovoi, and 
Dmitri Kovtun, another former KGB agent, who, it had emerged, met Litvinenko 
several times in October 2006—as well as on the day he fell ill. Kovtun is said 
currently to be in a Moscow hospital recovering from radiation poisoning, possibly 
connected to his meetings with Litvinenko. (2) 
 
But British police immediately were faced with a problem: on 5 December, 
Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika informed the press that Scotland Yard detectives 
would face serious restrictions in their investigation. Chaika stated that Russia 
would permit no extraditions in the case (13), and that British police officers 
would participate in the investigation only “with our consent.” Chaika added that 
Russian authorities might “withhold” their permission. (14) Chaika’s warnings 
apparently were realized as the Scotland Yard team sent to Russia returned to 
London after experiencing “a fortnight of frustration and obstruction by Russian 
officials,” with permission to interview several people apparently denied. (15) 
 
In spite of Russian obfuscation, Scotland Yard apparently has developed an 
important lead: using Litvinenko’s description of the “third man” who was present 
at his meeting with Lugovoi, an image has been captured from Heathrow airport 
security cameras, of a man—apparently of Central Asian descent—who, police 
suspect, may be Litvinenko’s killer. (16) 
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Russia has started its own inquiry into Litvinenko’s death, during the course of 
which both Lugovoi and Kovtun have been questioned. Indeed, in a move that 
can best be described as “chutzpa,” Moscow has requested that the British 
government allow it unrestricted access to more than 100 witnesses and 
“dozens” of locations in London, which apparently are vital to the investigation. 
(17) 
 
Russia’s investigation is now apparently geared towards a specific suspect: 
Leonid Nevzlin, former Deputy to imprisoned Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
Nevzlin has been directly accused of involvement in Litvinenko’s murder by 
Chaika, although the latter has not provided any indication of what the motive 
might have been. (18) 
 
The allegations against Nevzlin must be taken with more than a grain of salt: 
many of the “suspects” Russian police wish to interview in London are former 
Yukos officials, who sought asylum in Britain when Khodorkovsky was arrested 
and Yukos taken over. Russia has, on numerous occasions, pressed for their 
extradition and been refused by Whitehall. (19) It seems likely that interviews 
would lead to the presentation of “irrefutable” evidence against these officials in 
the murder inquiry—and therefore to renewed extradition requests. 
 
It is possible that Moscow is playing a game—‘we won’t allow extraditions' unless 
you extradite former Yukos officials back to Russia. In this scenario, the Kremlin 
may hope that London caves in to its long-term requests for Boris Berezovsky’s 
extradition. 
 
More likely however, is the conclusion that Scotland Yard officers are facing such 
difficulties because the authorities in Russia have something to hide in the 
Litvinenko inquiry. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) “Excerpts From An Interview With Federal Security Service Director Nikolai 
Patrushev,” Izvestia Daily, 15 Dec 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(2) “Director Of The Russian Federal Security Service Nikolai Patrushev: 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
Social reforms for the Russian military 
As abundant petrodollars continue to fuel Russia’s efforts to reemerge as a world 
player, the importance of a strong military has not been lost.  “It is well known 
that President Vladimir Putin’s key objective of restoring the effectiveness of 
Russian state power is intimately connected with the restoration of Russia’s 
military might.” (1)  After years of dwindling budgets, deteriorating weapons 
systems, and increasing corruption within the military, Russian military and 
government leaders are hanging their hopes for a positive turnaround on a broad 
series of sweeping reforms.  While a major military reengineering might be 
expected to focus primarily on examining external security threats, Russia's 
leadership realizes that it must get back to the basics.  Strong militaries are built 
around dedicated, disciplined personnel…not corrupt leadership, or poorly 
equipped and homeless soldiers.   
      
With bribery and bullying being acknowledged as routine behavior among 
soldiers, the primary ongoing reform efforts are centered on troop recruitment 
and treatment.  In the wake of last year’s high profile criminal case, in which a 
conscript was brutally beaten, the military has introduced an unprecedented new 
program.  “The first-ever parents’ committee in the Russian armed forces has 
been set up at the motorized rifle regiment of the Moscow Military District’s 
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training center in Korov, Vladimir Region.”  (2)  Although completely voluntary for 
the parents, every military unit with soldiers serving on a conscription basis will 
have such a council in place by 15 February 2007.  The stated purpose of this 
program is to “help the commanding officers of the military units to enhance 
military discipline and law and order, prevent offenses by personnel, build team 
spirit…and ensure safe conditions of military service.” (3)  As Deputy Defense 
Minister General Vladimir Isakov observed, “the eyes of parents are the best 
inspectors.” (4)  Of course, for years, unofficial groups of soldiers' mothers have 
tried to save their sons from brutal treatment and the new "parents' committees" 
may be intended to replace these fearless mothers with more tame 
organizations.  
      
Another set of reform efforts acknowledges the problems associated with basing 
a large portion of the military on mandatory conscription.  According to these 
initiatives, there will be a large shift to a professional volunteer force throughout 
all the military branches.  “To date, 42 army formations and units comprising over 
54,000 servicemen have been transferred to a contract basis.” (5)  According to 
Defense Minister Ivanov, “eighty-one formations and units will [ultimately] consist 
entirely of contract personnel.  That’s around 125,000 soldiers, sergeants, and 
sergeants-major.” (6)  By 2008, “seventy percent of military servicemen, including 
officers and warrant officers, will serve in the military on a contract basis,” 
according to President Putin. (7)  The highest priority front-line “permanent 
readiness units will only be manned by contract servicemen, whereas reduced-
strength units will [still] be manned by draftees.” (8)  The transition to an all-
volunteer force has been foreshadowed repeatedly over recent years. 
      
For conscripts, one of the benefits to be gained from increasing the size of the 
volunteer force is that conscription terms would decrease from two years to just 
12 months.  As recruitment offices completed their 2006 autumn call-up 
campaign, they also marked the last group of recruits who would serve two-year 
conscriptions.  Draftees brought into service in 2007 are to serve for eighteen 
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months, and in 2008 the term of service is to decrease to just one year.  (9)  
During a 15 January 2007 meeting with government members, President Putin 
expressed concern that “during one year of military service problems will 
definitely arise with working military hardware which is becoming increasingly 
complicated.” (10)  Therefore, even though the conscription period would be 
reduced to only one year, most draftees are to be required to complete a course 
of pre-call up training to maximize their effectiveness and efficiency.   
      
Despite these announced changes, the conscription process remains fraught 
with violence and corruption.   Just last month, St. Petersburg police arrested a 
senior recruitment official on sexual harassment charges.  “It emerged that [29-
year-old Aleksey Ivanov] had made appointments with young men to allegedly 
help them receive a deferment from conscription.  In the hallway of a block of 
flats [where the appointments were made] the officer would seduce his victims to 
having sex with him.” (11)  In another situation, Moscow police resorted to 
violence and beat the entire family of 20-year-old Andrei Zuyev, who had not 
appeared for draft processing, when the family refused to turn the young man 
over to them.  The family claimed that their son was exempt from military service.  
It was later discovered “that the conscription office had not in fact been looking 
for Andrei Zuyev but for another man with the same surname." (12)   
      
A contract force is planned to produce a much more effective military force, but 
government leaders must realize that living conditions have to be improved 
significantly if they expect to be able to attract sufficient volunteer soldiers.  Two 
issues desperately needing attention are salary levels and the availability of 
adequate housing.  In fact, “lack of housing and low wages are preventing many 
junior officers in the Russian army from starting families.” (13)  The birthrate is 
declining continuously among officers in the  Moscow Military District.  "There are 
on average [only] seven children per 10 families.” (14)  Though a large pay gap 
still exists between military members and their civilian counterparts, attempts 
have been made to reduce the disparity.  In a 9 January 2007 press release, the 
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government announced the signing of a resolution increasing the “money and 
allowances of military servicemen and employees of some federal executive 
bodies” by 10 percent, effective 1 January 2007. (15)  Additionally, “Pay for 
military service personnel and pensions of citizens discharged from military 
service will be increased…15% on November 1, 2007, and 15% on September 1, 
2008." (16)   
      
On the issue of housing, as of last autumn, there were approximately 400,000 
homeless servicemen.  In an attempt to address this problem, President Putin 
directed the allocation of 30 billion rubles in treasury funds over and above the 
regular military budget. (17)  Unfortunately, when additional money was allocated 
for housing previously, an interesting result was noted:  “The more 
money…security agencies receive for housing construction the faster the 
luxurious dachas of state officials are growing around the big cities.” (18)  
However, with the implementation of a new federally-subsidized mortgage 
program, officials are optimistic these instances of corruption can be avoided.  At 
a recent ceremony in Moscow where 200 military families received new flats, 
Defense Minister Ivanov said "the problem of housing for the military would soon 
be resolved.” (19)  “As the military would say, we have turned on the 
afterburners, and by 2010 we should finally close the issue of housing for the 
military…” (20)   
      
The Russian military remains undisciplined, underpaid, and filled with abusive 
and corrupt leadership.  However, a renewed and, more critically, sustained effort 
at social reforms could set them on an improved course.  Time will tell how 
effective the changes prove to be.  But “given the drastic decline of Russian 
military power in the 1990s and early 2000s,” even the most modest 
improvements can represent important reform. (21) 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (External) 
By Daniel DeBree 
 
The unfriendly skies 
Russia currently is in the process of establishing a sophisticated air defense 
buffer zone around its western and southern flanks by negotiating and 
developing command and control arrangements with its CIS neighbors.  Already 
poised to begin operations is the United Air Defense sector comprising Belarus 
and Western Russia. Russia has plans for similar agreements in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, to be implemented at a later date. 
 
Although political and economic relations between Belarus and Russia have 
been anything but harmonious recently, military leaders from both countries claim 
that disagreements over money will not “affect military to military cooperation or 
military-technical cooperation.”  (1)  While Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov was quick to stress cooperation, not long after his remarks Belarus 
demanded increased compensation for Russian military facilities in their country.  
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(2)  Apparently, the politicians and businessmen were not in agreement with their 
military counterparts. 
 
At issue are two Russian military facilities: the Russian space radar station at 
Baranavich and a naval command and control center at Vileyka (in land-locked 
Belarus).  Although both of these facilities are important parts of the Russian 
defense network, the space radar station probably is the most critical, as it is also 
a part of the impending agreement for the joint air defense network.  This facility 
is based around relatively sophisticated Volga radar, which was designed to 
detect ballistic missile attacks.  Having a nominal detection range of more than 
1000 kilometers and an azimuth sweep of 120 degrees, the radar guards more 
than 1M square kilometers of airspace on Russia's western border—its loss 
would represent a significant degradation in capability. (3) 
 
Considering the current situation, the radar site itself has an interesting history.  
The USSR originally started construction on this facility in 1979, but then quickly 
suspended work.  Deemed redundant, it was not until 1999 when a similar site in 
Skrunda, Latvia was lost that Russia continued the unfinished business at the 
Baranavich site.  (4)  Fully operational since 2003, this facility has been an 
integral part of the Russian defense against ballistic missiles.  Ivanov played 
down this importance, however, in the wake of the acrimony over oil. (5)  Stating 
that the facility “was not critical,” he reiterated that the “security of the Russian 
Federation” would not be compromised even if the facility were to close. (6)  This 
claim rings hollow, however, when one looks at the details.  The Belarus radar 
was finished specifically to cover the gap left by the loss of the Latvian site, 
although it could not quite cover the entire area.  Although the St. Petersburg 
radar, which was just switched on in December of 2006, goes a long way toward 
closing that gap, obviously it could not do so if its counterpart to the Southwest 
also were to close.  Rough calculations show that this would reduce coverage by 
a minimum of 600 kilometers.  Although it is not a catastrophic problem (Russia 
operated with a gap from 1999 until 2003), and, historically, Russian doctrine has 
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not called for 100% coverage, it still would require some capital and effort to 
rectify the less than optimal arrangement.  The good news for Russia is that 
newer technology allowed it to build a more reliable and more sophisticated 
system in eighteen months, rather than the five years or so it took to complete 
the Volga radar. (7) 
 
Even if Belarus does not compel Russia to close down the radar site, the 
question of compensation remains.  Although it appears that the Russians are 
not required to pay “rent” for their two military facilities in Belarus, closer 
inspection reveals a type of barter system.  Since 1995, the Belarussians have 
been allowed free time on the Russian military test and instrumentation ranges, 
which they have used almost annually to test-fire their surface to air missile 
systems. (8)  It seems that this arrangement is no longer acceptable and that the 
Belarussians are not only demanding rent for the facilities, but also compensation 
for their perceived protection of Russian airspace, to the tune of US $40-60M per 
year.  (9) 
 
Perhaps this tiny tripping point will be worked out in the Russian-Belarussian 
United Air Defense System, the agreement for which reportedly will be signed by 
the end of January.  The details that are available show that this will be a 
significant step in military cooperation for both countries.  The entire Belarussian 
Air Force will be a part of the agreement, while only the Russian Sixth Army of 
the Air Force and Air Defense Forces will be subject to its provisions. Perhaps 
the most important stipulation, however, is the command and control 
arrangement, whereby all of the above-named troops can be commanded by 
either a Belarussian or Russian commander. (10)  This is of some significance, 
since it is very difficult to work out such an arrangement between military 
organizations of two different countries. Although the agreement has not been 
finalized, Russia already has provided four S-300PS surface to air missile 
systems to the Belarussian 115th Air Defense Missile Brigade, which is now 
deployed around Brest and Grodno. (11) 
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So, will the bonds “between two brother people” be strong enough to see these 
military preparations through the storm of economic and political wrangling, as is 
claimed by Sergei Ivanov?  Many analysts see Belarus leaning toward the West 
these days and note the purported animosity between Presidents Putin and 
Lukashenka. (12)  In fact, Putin announced earlier this month that Belarus should 
be prepared for “significantly reduced” support in the future, which does not bode 
well for the joint military commanders.  (13)  In either case, one will not have long 
to wait, as the air defense agreement is slated to be signed by the end of 
January. 
 
Regardless of the situation in the West, Russia also is planning to shore up its 
defenses in other areas.  Plans for a united air defense of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia will be revealed at a meeting of defense ministers, scheduled for the 
middle of next month in Yerevan.  Reportedly, plans are to establish a system 
much like the Belarus arrangement, first in the Caucasus, and then much later in 
Central Asia. (14) 
 
Already well established in the Caucasus, Russia has two significant Air Defense 
facilities in Armenia, the 102nd Base and an airfield at Erebuni.  Both of these 
facilities house state of the art equipment, with the 102nd employing S-300 
missiles and MiG-29 fighters flying out of Erebuni.  In addition, the Russians have 
spent a significant amount of capital over the past year modernizing and training 
the Armenian Air Force.  In fact, they have trained the Armenians to operate their 
S-300s.  Significant improvements also were completed on Armenian command 
and control facilities. (15) 
 
Much like Armenia, the command and control equipment in Tajikistan is due for 
an overhaul, which the Russians gladly are supplying.  According to the Deputy 
Commander of the Russian Air Force, Lieutenant General Aitech Bizhev, the 
country now is fitted with the latest Russian equipment and will be able to receive 
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a comprehensive air picture no later than the middle of 2007.  The Tajiks also are 
scheduled to receive some navigation equipment, in addition to the command 
and control infrastructure. (16) 
 
Kazakhstan is a different story, however, as it is making a concerted effort to 
remain independent from Russia with respect to military hardware and 
communications equipment.  The Kazakhs are pursuing contracts with other 
countries actively, which would significantly complicate compatibility issues in 
any type of combined air defense network.  Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has some 
of the highest readiness rates for its aircraft of any country in that region, and it 
also is experiencing an economic boom that will allow it to be choosy in its 
military procurement.  Russia, for its part, will stress economy of scale and the 
added efficiency and lethality to be gained by participating in an integrated air 
defense network of several countries. (17) 
 
If this comprehensive air defense plan comes to fruition, Russia will have 
significantly pushed out its air defense “borders,” allowing it to react to real or 
perceived threats more quickly, and more importantly, before they ever enter 
Russian airspace. 
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A change of course in energy? 
The recent energy dispute between Russia and Belarus has brought back 
memories of past crises, such as the one that took place a year ago involving 
Ukraine, during which millions across Europe saw their gas deliveries shut down 
for four days in the dead of winter. This particular dispute, however, has a 
somewhat different dynamic than others, due to the very peculiar nature of the 
Russo-Belarusian relationship, and, for that reason, may have a more lasting 
effect on the future conduct of Russian energy policy with its neighboring states. 
 
A short while before he became president of Russia, Vladimir Putin reportedly 
wrote a policy paper in which he outlined ways in which Russia could regain its 
superpower status. “Russia's natural resource potential,” wrote Putin, “defines its 
special place among industrialized countries." (1)  One of the main ways in which 
Russian natural resources are used as an instrument of foreign policy has been 
the export of crude oil and natural gas to members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States at prices below market value. In the case of Belarus, which 
since 1999 has been bound, at least on paper, with Russia via the Union 
Treaty—this price has been fixed for some time at US $47 per 1000 cubic meters 
of gas and US $27 per barrel of oil. For 2006, these prices, when compared to 
the estimated market value for oil and gas, amounted to a subsidy of about $6.6 
billion. (2) That amount, however, is equal to approximately 23% of Belarus' GDP 
during the same year. (3) Since all energy enterprises in Belarus are state-
owned, this subsidy may be termed foreign aid—an instrument of foreign policy 
that is by no means new or unique. By comparison, Israel—the largest recipient 
of US economic aid—received a total of $240 million, which amounts to about 
.02% of Israel’s GDP. (4)  In other words, Russia’s use of economic assistance 
as an instrument of foreign policy in the case of its relationship with Belarus is on 
a completely different scale than what is typically practiced between donors and 
their recipients, even in cases where the partnership is extremely important, both 
strategically and symbolically. 
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What, then, has been the benefit to Russia (after all, a country rife with its own 
economic problems) from such a massive investment in this rather small, 
seemingly insignificant country that has the status of a pariah state? To continue 
the example of Israel, it is interesting to note that Lukashenko’s Belarus is, in a 
peculiar way, analogous to the former, except in reverse: whereas Israel is the 
only fully democratic state in the Middle East, Belarus has the distinction of being 
the only remaining fully authoritarian state in Europe, since the ousting of 
Serbia’s former president Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. Since Lukashenko’s 
election in 1994, Belarus has essentially retained the old Soviet economic and 
political system; therefore, it has had a very different experience than Russia 
during the immediate post-Soviet epoch. Not all the differences, incidentally, 
have been negative—for example, Belarus was able to avoid major crises such 
as the 1998 default, and did not experience the same economic disparity 
between different segments of the population that accompanied privatization in 
Russia during the 1990s. The point is that, while culturally very similar, Russia 
and Belarus are in fact qualitatively different enough that their relationship is not 
simply a matter of ideological affinity. There have been, of course, some concrete 
benefits for Russia as well–for example, one of the favors that Russia received in 
return for the subsidies was essentially unrestricted transit across Belarus to 
countries of the European Union. From a purely economic standpoint this is not 
very significant, since the costs associated with transit that Russia otherwise 
would have had to pay are insignificant compared to the total amount of 
subsidies. (5)  More significant from a geopolitical perspective, is that this 
unrestrained access meant that Russia essentially had a border with the EU, at 
least as far as oil and gas deliveries were concerned. For a country aspiring to 
attain a “special place among the industrial countries” such direct access allowed 
Russia to use resources as political leverage with the EU, without having to 
consider the transfer country, and helped re-create the image of an empire, 
projecting its power beyond its official borders. 
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All this means that the recent crisis cannot be dismissed as simply a routine 
economic dispute, but, rather, it represents a significant shift in Russia’s conduct 
of foreign policy in the Near Abroad. On November 3, Gazprom announced that it 
would raise the price of gas to $200 per 1000 cubic meters (four times the 
present cost!) by the start of 2007. (6)  Then, on December 8, Gazprom declared 
that it would move toward delivering oil and gas to CIS member states at market 
prices, (7) a position it repeated December 19 at an official meeting. (8)  If 
Gazprom moves ahead with this plan, Russia, as a result, voluntarily will give up 
one of its hitherto principal methods of projecting its influence. Additionally, the 
move already has damaged Russia's image as a reliable partner in energy 
delivery abroad, together with the use of the "energy weapon" against Georgia. 
 
The energy crisis has caused serious concern in the EU over the reliability of 
Russia as a natural resource supplier. Meeting with Putin in Sochi on January 21, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed disapproval over the fact that 
Russia had halted oil deliveries via the Friendship pipeline without informing its 
recipients first. (Transneft closed the pipeline on January 8, in response to an 
imposition by Belarus of a $45 per ton tax for transit of oil through its territory—
itself a response to Gazprom’s price increase and to Russia’s imposition of an 
import levy—and to allegations that Belarus had siphoned off oil from the pipeline 
as payment in kind for the levy). (9) On the surface then, it appears that Russia 
may have suffered yet another PR loss. However, the crisis has highlighted a fact 
that Merkel and other leaders of the EU probably are reluctant to admit—namely, 
that if they want reliable supplies of Russian oil and gas, it is in their interest to 
preserve the “special” Russo-Belarusian relationship, whatever the nature of the 
political regimes. If Putin’s main concern regarding Belarus is to avoid a “color” 
revolution in Minsk along the lines of Ukraine and Georgia, the crisis actually may 
have reduced the chances of this happening—ironically, with Europe’s backing. 
 
New inroads in the Middle East? 
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2007 brings a whole set of developments in the Middle East. The combination of 
the increasingly provocative and assertive behavior of Iran—whose power may 
increase dramatically if the Hezbollah-led opposition succeeds in toppling the 
current Lebanese government—with the continuing commitment of the United 
States to remain in the region (as signaled by President Bush’s “surge” in Iraq 
and the naval buildup in the Persian Gulf) raises the possibility of a serious 
confrontation between the global superpower and the rising regional power. Up 
until now, it seems, Russia had been content to sell arms (most recently, the Tor-
M1 surface-to-air missile system) to Iran, under the assumption that it would help 
maintain a sort of balance of power in the region against American influence. As 
of yet, there have not been signs of major changes in Russia’s position; on 
January 16, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that "If the Iranian leadership 
has a desire to purchase more defensive weapons, we would do that." (10)  Nor 
has the passing of UN Resolution No. 1737 on December 23 had any effect on 
these sales, since the sanctions imposed by the resolution involve only materials 
that can be used either for uranium enrichment or for the construction of heavy 
water reactors or heavy water processing plants; it does not mention 
conventional weapons at all. (11)  It appears, then, that the Russian position on 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions can be summarized as follows: Russia will not actively 
support Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, but neither will it actively oppose it; 
and in the meantime, it will gladly supply Iran’s conventional arsenal. 
 
Meanwhile, an editorial in a Lebanon daily that supports the “March 14 Forces” 
(those who supported the expulsion of Syrian troops after the assassination of 
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and who support the current Prime Minister 
Fuad Seniora) suggested after Seniora’s meeting with Putin in the Kremlin on 
December 15 that “Moscow wants points of entry to the Middle East not only 
through the Syrian gate.” (12)  There may be some truth to this, since this was 
not the first time Putin expressed interest in Lebanon. Several months earlier, 
following the war between Israel and Hezbollah, Russia offered assistance 
(which was accepted) in the reconstruction of bridges damaged by Israeli bombs 
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during the war. An engineering unit from Chechnya was deployed beginning in 
August, consisting entirely of local (Muslim) soldiers—a fact that Putin made a 
point to emphasize during Seniora’s visit. (13)  He then went on, reportedly, to 
urge Seniora to try to settle the present crisis “in a bilateral fashion, without 
relying on outside forces,” and “not to provoke the opposition by approving the 
[international] tribunal, explaining that as Russia sees it, this tribunal is not 
intended to discover the murderers of Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri but is 
[merely] an American instrument for exerting pressure on Syria and its allies.” 
(14)  Such a formulation casts doubt on whether, indeed, Russia really seeks to 
open a “Lebanese gate” into the Middle East, suggesting instead that Russian 
activities in Beirut are more of an attempt to keep the Syrian gate opened. Either 
way, at the present moment, it appears that Russia’s disputes with her neighbors 
over oil and gas prices are of more immediate concern than the situation in the 
Middle East.     
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
GEORGIA 
Volte-face? Russian embassy open for business in Tbilisi  
On Thursday, 18 January, President Putin summoned Russia’s ambassador to 
Georgia, Alexander Kovalenko, to the Kremlin to inform him that he would be 
retuning to work in Tbilisi the following Monday. After four months of deadlock 
exacerbated by a series of sanctions and punitive measures representing a 
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sustained attempt by Moscow to beggar its neighbor, the Kremlin’s move to 
restore diplomatic ties with Tbilisi is the sort of abrupt volte-face that gives foreign 
policy analysts a case of whiplash. 
             
What happened? 
In September of last year the Russian ambassador in Tbilisi, together with his 
staff, was recalled to Moscow together following Georgia’s arrest of four Russian 
intelligence officers on spying charges. The move effectively to cut diplomatic ties 
between the two countries presaged an escalation in tensions aggravated by 
Moscow’s punitive embargo on Georgian wine, mineral water and produce, a ban 
on travel visas, postal service and money transfers between the two countries, 
and the mistreatment of Georgian nationals living and working in Russia, over a 
thousand of whom suffered unwarranted deportation. The Kremlin’s recent 
decision to resume diplomatic operations in Tbilisi is a positive indication that 
channels of communication will be reopened between the two countries. Whether 
it marks a substantive change in Kremlin policy toward Georgia, however, 
remains to be seen. 
 
The most jarring element in the story is the sunny rhetoric with which Putin 
announced the reinstatement of the Russian resident ambassador in Tbilisi. 
Ambassador Alexander Kovalenko, he said, “heads for a country that can claim 
not only special relations but good-neighborliness and friendship with Russia.” 
(1). 
 
In light of recent events, his congenial words had a discordant ring. A caller to a 
Russian Razvorot radio program commented on the president’s distorted notion 
of friendship, adding that, “had someone been a friend to me like we are friends 
to Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus [and] the Baltics, I would have tried to 
keep as far away from such friends as possible.” (2)  Friendship was certainly not 
in evidence at the November meeting of the two countries’ presidents in the 
corridor of the CIS summit held in Minsk. The meeting reportedly amounted to 
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little more than an exchange of mutual reproach after which, in response to 
questions from journalists, Putin tersely replied that he and Saakashvili had met, 
and that was the end of it. (3)  For his part, Saakashvili left the encounter 
resolved that, “it is time for us, Georgians, to understand that it won’t have any 
decisive importance for us what Russia will think, say or do in respect to 
Georgia.” (4)              
             
Good-neighborliness could not be said to characterize the relationship between 
the two countries at the close of last year, as Georgia faced uncertainty over 
natural gas supplies and the prospect of paying the “political price” of $235 per 
1,000 cubic meters of gas as charged by Gazprom. Tbilisi’s bid for diversification 
of energy supplies fell apart in late December after technical problems in the 
Shah-Deniz gas fields scuttled the tentative deals forged by Georgia’s energy 
ministry with Turkey and Azerbaijan, forcing Georgia’s domestic energy 
companies to sign independent deals with Gazprom, a cause for some 
embarrassment to the Saakashvili government. 
 
Relations were strained further by attacks that occurred in late December and 
early January in the Gali district of Abkhazia that left police officers dead on both 
the Georgian and Abkhazian sides. A statement appearing on the website of the 
Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the attacks “a carefully planned and 
deliberate provocation aimed at further escalating the tension in the conflict zone 
that, there is much likelihood, may lead to irreparable consequences.” (5)  The 
statement goes on to lay the blame for the attacks squarely on the gross 
negligence of Russian peacekeepers who failed to act on their mandate to 
defuse tensions in the security zone. 
 
The new year opened with further deterioration in neighborly goodwill as 
Georgian truck drivers blockaded the Transcaucasian highway by parking their 
rigs loaded with tangerines at the border with Russia (i.e. North Ossetia) in 
protest over the Russian ban on Georgian citrus imports. The latest incident (on 
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11 January), in which Georgian officials seized a Russian fishing vessel off the 
coast of Abkhazia for allegedly trespassing into Georgian territorial waters, points 
to a growing assertiveness on the part of Georgians chafing at Russia’s 
infringement upon Georgian sovereign interests. Their cause is being taken up 
by a delegation of Georgian lawmakers in Strasbourg who are lobbying the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) to hold a debate on 
Russian sanctions and human rights violations against Georgian citizens. The 
hearing is unlikely to take place, however, following the reinstatement of the 
Russian ambassador to Tbilisi. As the chairman of the Russian Federation 
Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mikhail Margelov, remarked on 19 
January, “if the normalization process has started, what is there to debate?” (6) 
 
Why now? 
Why has Putin decided that it is in Russia’s best interest to normalize relations 
with Georgia now, after months of blatant disregard for diplomatic protocol from 
the Kremlin? Surely Moscow is under no real threat of censure from PACE, or 
any other body within the international community, given that they have failed 
time and again to deliver substantive resolutions in Georgia’s defense. The 
Russian ambassador’s return to Tbilisi may rather be read in two ways: 1) as a 
gesture of goodwill on the part of a primary energy supplier toward a client state; 
2) as an attempt to draw a member of the CIS in the apogee of its orbit away 
from Moscow back into Russia’s gravitational sphere. The first argument was put 
forward by Putin in a statement that “the first significant step [toward the 
resumption of diplomatic relations] was made last December, when we signed an 
agreement on Russian gas supplies to Georgia. It is important that these 
supplies will be made according to the market principles.” He stressed that “the 
sides assumed some commitments, and Russia will fulfill them,” making the 
move toward diplomacy a supposed model of honest dealing in supplier-client 
relations that Russia may use to reassure apprehensive European parties in 
upcoming energy deals. (7)  More immediately, if the Kremlin hopes to keep 
Georgia as a gas consumer paying premium market value for Russian 
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commodities, it had best maintain a veneer of civility. The second argument is 
somewhat more elliptical, though several recent developments offer evidence to 
substantiate the claim that Russia has need of Georgian cooperation. In charging 
Ambassador Kovalenko with his renewed responsibilities, Putin named 
settlement of regional frozen conflicts as “one of the most important directions of 
our activities.” (8)  With the Kosovo question at the top of the Russian agenda, 
the claims of breakaway provinces is indeed a two-edged sword for the Kremlin. 
 
Is it over? 
Points of contention remain fixed between the two governments, including the 
fundamental question of how to resolve the issue of autonomy in the breakaway 
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While the Kremlin has pledged to 
resume travel and postal links between Russia and Georgia, the ban on 
Georgian wine and produce remains in place for the time being and no new 
Russian visas will be issued to Georgian citizens in the near future, according to 
Moscow. (9)  
             
Tbilisi has been at pains to modulate its rhetoric and avoid bellicose language so 
as not to offend Moscow or its allies in the international community, most notably 
by removing the hawkish defense minister Okruashvili from office, who fanned 
the flames when he announced that he would celebrate New Year’s 2007 in 
Tskhinvali, capital of the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia. His 
reappointment to the economic ministry in November was received in Moscow 
with evident satisfaction. For its part, Russia continues tardily to withdraw its 
troops from Georgian territory. And perhaps the most emollient balm of all, 
Georgia is again an energy client to Russia, albeit reluctantly. 
 
Who won? 
The Independent crows that Moscow “blinked first” in its four month spat with 
Georgia. (10)  That assertion, while not wholly untrue, is misleading. Moscow is 
not a capital that concedes defeat, particularly when it comes to relations with the 
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former Soviet republics. The Kremlin is cannier than that, and perhaps another 
agenda in Moscow is well served now that relations with Tbilisi have been 
normalized. The Kremlin’s priorities have been and remain: dominance in the 
former Soviet republics and on the world energy market. And now the question of 
autonomy for Kosovo, a decision by which Moscow is weighing its influence on 
the international stage, and a case that will have huge consequences for 
breakaway provinces in the CIS either way the issue ultimately is decided. 
 
The restoration of diplomatic recognition of Tbilisi may be the result of energy 
politics or it may represent an opportunity to keep a closer watch on a neighbor in 
anticipation of interesting times to come. Or, perhaps Moscow did recognize that 
its policies were producing a stronger, more assertive and independent Georgia. 
In that case, they had nothing left to lose there. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Kyrgyz president, parliament begin 2007 with renewed confrontation 
After seeming to resolve the bulk of their differences through constitutional 
reform in November 2006, President Kurmanbek Bakiev and the Jogorku 
Kengesh are once again at loggerheads and the parliament itself is divided on 
how to proceed.  Their truce, shaky at best, began crumbling in mid-December, 
when Prime Minister Feliks Kulov and his cabinet offered their resignations to 
President Bakiev, in a move designed to force new parliamentary elections (1).  
Prime Minister Kulov announced that he and his cabinet ministers had resigned 
in compliance with the new constitution, (2) which grants whatever party holds a 
parliamentary majority the authority to choose the prime minister. (3)  The fact 
that at present there is no majority party in the Jogorku Kengesh poses a major 
stumbling block in this process and casts doubt as to whether or not the current 
parliament can act legally in any capacity.  The new constitution also increased 
the number of seats in parliament from 75 to 90 and stipulates that half of the 
MPs should be elected on party slates. (4)  Thus, it would seem perfectly logical 
for the government to resign and for new parliamentary elections to take place, 
except for the fact that when the new constitution was adopted in November, the 
president and parliament agreed that the reforms would not take effect until 
2010, a solution which left both sides dissatisfied. (5) 
 
Faced with the threat of parliament’s dissolution and new elections which could 
cost them their seats, 55 Jogorku Kengesh deputies issued a signed appeal to 
 38 
the president to begin a review of the constitution, in order to reconcile any 
contradictions in its language and more clearly delineate the division of power 
between the executive and the legislature. (6)  President Bakiev responded by 
requesting that parliament restore a number of his powers that were eliminated 
by the constitutional reform in November: the authority to appoint local 
administration chiefs and regional governors; the authority to recommend 
candidates for the Supreme Court and for local judgeships to parliament; and 
that the Interior Ministry, National Security Service, and Emergencies Ministry be 
transferred back to presidential control.  In return for the restoration of these 
powers, the president pledged to refrain from calling for the parliament’s 
dissolution. (7)  President Bakiev’s office then submitted a new draft constitution 
for legislative review which included the above-mentioned changes, as well as a 
note regarding two “discrepancies” found in the new constitution, which he asked 
parliament to resolve: the total number of parliamentary seats (75 in the old 
constitution, 90 in the new one) and the right to nominate a candidate for the 
office of prime minister (according to the old constitution, the president has this 
right; the new constitution transferred this power to the legislature). (8) 
 
Following much wrangling between various members of parliament and the 
president, threats by opposition members to impeach the president (9) or to call 
for a presidential election in March 2007 (three years early) (10), parliament’s 
rejection of the first draft of the newly reformed constitution, (11) and the 
proposal by a small group of MPs to dissolve the Jogorku Kengesh and hold new 
elections (12) a new edition of the constitution was finally adopted on 30 
December. The latest version of the constitution restores those powers which the 
president had requested (see above), as well as granting him the right to form a 
government until 2010, during the “transitional period.” (13)   The Jogorku 
Kengesh’s actions were promptly denounced by the head of Kyrgyzstan’s Human 
Rights Commission, Tursunbek Akun, who declared parliament had violated the 
rights of his country’s citizens by amending the constitution due to coercion by 
the presidential administration. (14)  Nonetheless, President Bakiev signed the 
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amended constitution into law on 15 January (15) and the following day 
proceeded to nominate Feliks Kulov for the post of prime minister, leading to a 
new showdown with parliament. (16) 
 
As of 23 January, the president has nominated Mr. Kulov twice, only to have the 
Jogorku Kengesh reject his candidacy on both occasions.  With their latest 
rejection of Mr. Kulov’s nomination, the MPs also informed the president that by 
nominating the same candidate twice, he has violated the constitution and that 
he is obliged to submit a new name. The president’s legislative liaison, Myrza 
Kaparov, disputes this statement, claiming that the present constitution allows 
Bakiev to nominate the same candidate up to three times (17).  According to the 
president’s interpretation of the constitution, if his nominee for prime minister is 
rejected three times, he has the authority to dissolve parliament (18).  Unless at 
least one side is willing to compromise, President Bakiev and the Jogorku 
Kengesh deputies seem destined for a head-on confrontation within the next few 
days.  MPs are considering a draft resolution which orders the president to stop 
nominating Feliks Kulov for reappointment as prime minister.  The resolution will 
be put to a vote on 25 January. (19) 
 
Both the Kyrgyz president and parliament seem to have painted themselves into 
opposing corners, with neither side willing to yield so much as an inch.  It is 
difficult to envision a positive outcome from the present situation; in fact, it is 
difficult to envision anything other than the government’s collapse.  Perhaps this 
is precisely the goal that one or both sides are working to achieve, in the hope 
that it will force another regime change. 
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